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Abstract
Background: A peculiar phenomenon of engaging insurance intermediaries for government funded health
insurance schemes for the poor, not usually found globally, is gaining ground in India. Rajiv Aarogyasri Scheme
launched in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, is first largest tax funded community health insurance scheme in
the country covering more than 20 million poor families. Aarogyasri Health Care Trust (trust), the scheme administrator,
transfers funds to hospitals through two routes one, directly and the other through an insurance intermediary. The
objective of this paper is to find out if engaging an insurance intermediary has any effect on cost efficiency of the
insurance scheme.
Methods: We used payment data of RAS for the period 2007–12, to find out the influence of insurance intermediary
on the two variables, benefit cost ratio defined as benefit payment divided by premium payment, and claim denial
ratio defined as benefit payment divided by treatment cost. Relationship between scheme expenditure and number of
beds empanelled under the scheme is examined. OLS regression is used to perform all analyses.
Results: We found that adding an additional layer of insurance intermediary between the trust and hospitals reduced
the benefit cost ratio under the scheme by 12.2 % (p-value = 0.06). Every addition of 100 beds under the scheme
increases the scheme payments by US$ 0.75 million (p-value < 0.001). The gap in claim denial ratio between insurance
and trust modes narrowed down from 2.84 % in government hospitals to 0.41 % in private hospitals (p-value < 0.001).
Conclusions: The scheme is a classic case of Roemer's principle in operation. Introduction of insurance intermediary
has the twin effects of reduction in benefit payments to beneficiaries, and chocking fund flow to government
hospitals. The idea of engaging insurance intermediary should be abandoned.
Background
In 2007, Andhra Pradesh introduced Rajiv Aarogyasri
community health insurance Scheme (RAS) for treating
the catastrophic illnesses of the 21 million Below Poverty
Line (BPL) families requiring in-patient admissions. The
scheme, implemented by Aarogyasri Health Care Trust
(AHCT or trust), provides end-to-end cashless services
for identified tertiary care diseases through a network of
Government and private hospitals [1]. RAS is the first
large scale demand side financed health insurance
scheme launched in India. While on one hand, the
scheme gave great political dividends due to the excep-
tional goodwill generated among the masses, on the
other, it received a lot of criticism that a disproportion-
ately large share of tax money is being routed to the
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private hospitals on a small number of tertiary care pa-
tients. In this paper, we study the fund transfer mechan-
ism under the scheme in order to find out whether
engaging an insurance intermediary has a positive or
negative impact on the scheme.
The Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) launched
the scheme initially with around 300 treatments or ther-
apies with the help of an insurance intermediary; the
method of implementation being commonly referred as
insurance mode. An year later in 2008, GoAP introduced
about 600 additional treatments directly administered by
trust; the implementation method commonly referred as
trust mode. A total of 938 treatments were launched
under the scheme in all the 23 districts and five regions
of the state by 2008. The state was divided into five geo-
graphical regions for the sake of convenience while
implementing the scheme and each region offered all
the 938 therapies. In each region, AHCT offered some
of the 938 therapies through insurance mode and some
through trust mode. The mix of therapies under the in-
surance mode and the trust mode changed in each re-
gion every year. During the period 2008–2011, the
number of therapies offered under insurance mode
ranged between 192 and 938 while that under the trust
mode ranged between 586 to 938 [2]. The insurance
intermediary is selected through a bidding process.
GoAP transfers the yearly RAS budget through period-
ical advances to the trust bank account. Trust transfers
this amount under the head 'bulk premium' to the insur-
ance intermediary as half-yearly advances. Hospitals
willing to offer services under the scheme make an ap-
plication to the Trust. The Trust inspects such hospitals
and registers (empanels) them if they meet the required
quality standards. Trust empanels only hospitals with
more than 50 beds. An individual needing tertiary care,
hailing from any region, is free to approach any hospital.
The hospital makes a real-time preauthorisation request
on the Information Technology (IT) platform of the
trust, asking for permission to treat the case. Trust
issues pre-authorisation to the case, and hospital
treats the patient and submits a claim on the IT plat-
form of the Trust. Depending on who is administer-
ing the type of therapy in that region at the time of
preauthorisation, the insurance intermediary or the
trust makes the payment to the hospital. By 2013,
AHCT phased out the insurance intermediary and
was administering all the 938 procedures through the
trust mode. Against this backdrop, there exists an al-
ternate view that engaging an insurance intermediary
is necessary to run the scheme efficiently, control
Supplier Induced Demand (SID), and reduce the
costs. SID is the situation where a doctor, exploiting
the information asymmetry, advises the patient to
consume more care than is required clinically.
Our literature search did not yield any successful exam-
ples in the developed or developing countries in the world
where countries transferred tax money directly to private
insurance companies for administering wholly govern-
ment funded health insurance schemes for their people.
The advocates of insurance intermediary administered
government funded health insurance schemes in India put
forth the arguments of government inexperience, control-
ling SID, risk absorption, efficient operations, quality of
care, controlling moral hazard and outsourcing of man-
power as the reasons for engaging the insurance
intermediary.
AHCT states that it did not have the expertise and the
time to roll out a large scale health insurance scheme at
short notice in April, 2007. Therefore, an insurance
intermediary was engaged to help AHCT set up an im-
plementation system and later run on its own [9]. Third
Party Administrator (TPA) is a management contractor
for health insurance firms in India, licenced by the Insur-
ance Regulatory and Development Authority of India
(IRDA). The experience of Vajpayee Aarogyasri of Karna-
taka state, launched after RAS and implemented without
any insurance intermediary shows that the TPA route is a
viable alternative. One hurdle to the TPA route is the pro-
hibition by IRDA on TPAs to serve Government funded
health insurance schemes directly. However, TPAs have
been circumventing this prohibition by floating sister
companies to service such schemes.
The Government created AHCT, an autonomous trust,
as the single-payer health insurance agency to imple-
ment RAS. From 2013 onwards, AHCT has been suc-
cessfully administering the scheme in the entire state
through the trust mode without an insurance intermedi-
ary. The trust set up with tax money and answerable to
the tax-payer, cannot express inability to perform the
task assigned to it under its deed of formation [10].
There is a presumption that recruiting manpower per-
manently on the rolls of the government renders them
lazy and useless because of the job security that a public
job provides. Permanent recruitment in the state is re-
stricted to the barest minimum and a policy of hiring
through third party agencies is being adopted for the last
twenty years. Almost a third of the government is
manned by outsourced staff currently [11]. Hiring staff
through third parties by government has seen many
problems such as creation of hope of permanent absorp-
tion, nepotism during recruitment, non-payment of
statutory allowances by the manpower hirers, suicides,
strikes for grievance redressal and so on. The suicides
and agitations by staff manning the government run
‘108’ ambulance services and other health services such
as ‘104’ services, outsourced to some of the best private
firms in the country, resulting in frequent disruption of
emergency services across the country are evidence of
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the failure of growing reliance on outsourced staff
[12–17]. It may not be possible for government to
disown the responsibility of outsourced staff deliver-
ing cutting edge services by distancing itself from
the management contractor who hires the staff. Dur-
ing elections voters question the government for deliv-
ery of services and not the management contractor. In
the absence of a systematic government hiring policy
and contract management, mere replacement of per-
manent manpower with outsourced staff is unlikely to
yield desired results. A large field level workforce of
more than 2000 staff continue to work for RAS, with
or without an insurance intermediary, as long as the
government policy continues the scheme. Once such a
large trained workforce is under deployment, it is not
possible to retrench them and recruit a fresh set of
people every time a new insurance intermediary is en-
gaged. The issues relating to staff persist even if a TPA
is engaged because as long as the government policy
supports demand side financing, the staff hired under
the scheme cannot be retrenched.
Trust also made sustained efforts to improve the qual-
ity of service in both government and private hospitals
with varying success. While government hospitals were
slow to respond to quality standards the response of pri-
vate hospitals is more encouraging. Furthermore, it is
also widely recognised that the ration card is owned not
only by BPL families but also APL families in the state.
This strategy has helped move RAS closer to being a
universal health care coverage scheme.
Starting with a budget of about US$10 million in 2007,
RAS consumption stood stably at around US$200 mil-
lion during the years 2012 and 2013. Officials of the
trust state that the number of hospitals empanelled
under RAS influence the total expenditure under the
scheme. Roemer's law says that in an insured population,
a hospital bed built is a filled bed; this forms the basis
for the argument of SID in healthcare [3]. Trust officials
state that Roemer's principle is often used by the insur-
ance intermediary in regulating the hospitals empanelled
under RAS in order to reduce the benefit payments to
hospitals. The tenth recommendation of High Level Ex-
pert Group(HLEG) report on Universal Health Covera-
ge(UHC) for India says that purchases of all health care
services under the UHC system should be undertaken
directly by government or through quasi-governmental
autonomous agencies and not through insurance inter-
mediaries [4]. In view of the conflict between HLEG rec-
ommendation and views expressed by certain quarters,
this paper studies the experience of RAS in order to an-
swer the question: should government engage an insur-
ance intermediary for running Rajiv Aarogyasri Scheme?
Benefit Cost Ratio(BCR) generally indicates the effi-
ciency with which expenditure of public funds is made
under a health scheme. Similarly, the denial of payments
to public hospitals and private hospitals would reveal
discrimination if any. This study therefore assesses the
impact of engaging an insurance intermediary on BCR
and claim denials to hospitals by comparing the insur-
ance and trust modes.
Methods
Study variables
The following variables were used in the analysis:
(1)Claim Ratio or Benefit Cost Ratio(BCR) is defined as
claim paid divided by premium paid. Claim paid is
the benefit payments made to the hospitals either by
the insurance intermediary or the trust. Premium
for insurance mode is the amount paid by AHCT to
the insurance intermediary inclusive of sales tax.
Premium for the trust mode is calculated notionally
as the sum of administrative cost plus claim paid.
Administrative cost of insurance mode is calculated
by deducting the claim paid from the premium paid.
(2)Claim Denial Ratio (CDR) is defined as the amount
denied divided by treatment cost. Treatment cost is
the total cost of treatments done by the hospitals
out of preauthorised treatments. Amount denied is
the amount which remains undisbursed out of the
treatment cost.
(3)Hospitals is the number of empanelled hospitals
existing as on 1st April of the year.
(4)Beds is the total number of beds in all the empanelled
hospitals as on 1st April of the year.
(5)Payments is the amount disbursed to empanelled
hospitals under the scheme.
(6)Year refers to calendar year.
(7)Mode refers to insurance mode or trust mode.
(8)Hospital type is private hospital or government
hospital.
Data
The data relating to payments to hospitals, premium
payments, administrative costs and empanelment of hos-
pitals was obtained from AHCT for the period 2007-
2012 [5, 2]. 1470(2.5 %) of the patients discharged
during March and April, 2013 were sampled through
simple random sampling and were interviewed by tele-
phone from the State ‘104’ call centre in order to assess
the patient satisfaction rates. ‘104’ is the name given to
the 24x7 call centre run by the Government for provid-
ing health advise and information to the citizens. The re-
spondents were asked from ‘104’ call centre if the
treatment was very bad, bad, average, good or very good.
Data for patient satisfaction rates was obtained from
‘104’ call centre [2].
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Data analysis
The analysis involved comparison of BCR and CDR
with and without the insurance intermediary by using
linear regression models. AHCT prescribed a standard
preauthorisation and claims procedure for all the 938
therapies, the five regions of the state as well as both
modes of implementation. Insurance intermediary as
well as trust processed the preauthorisation and claims
for all types of therapies and for all the five regions in
the state on the same IT platform provided by AHCT.
In view of this standardisation, the variables viz., region
and type of therapy were omitted from the analysis. Data
for patient satisfaction rates was available only without in-
surance intermediary; no comparison could therefore be
made with and without insurance intermediary.
We used the following linear regression model for esti-
mating the impact of insurance intermediary on BCR.
BCR ¼ αþ β1 mode
where, mode is a dummy variable equal to 0 for insur-
ance mode and 1 for trust mode.
As AHCT did not administer any part of the scheme
during the first year (2007), the administrative cost was
imputed using Bayesian linear regression method [6].
The influence of hospital type on difference in CDR
between the insurance and trust modes was examined
using the model
CDRinsurance−CDRtrust ¼ αþ β1  hospital type
where, hospital type is a dummy variable equal to 0 for
government hospitals and 1 for private hospitals.
For testing the influence of hospital beds on scheme
payments we used the linear regression model below.
Payments ¼ αþ β1  beds
Testing for heteroskedasticity and functional form was
done using Breusch-Pagan test and Ramsey's RESET
test. Robust testing using heteroskedasticity consistent
procedure for small samples was done for all the three
linear regression models [7].
Ethics statement
The survey in this study was conducted with the ap-
proval of Government of Andhra Pradesh, India which
also permitted publication of the survey results of the
treated patients [8]. This research is in compliance with
the Helsinki Declaration. AHCT which is a Government
Trust obtained informed consent prior to the conduct of
survey over telephone and all the participants were
adults. AHCT Parents or guardians served as proxy for
those below 18 years.
Results and discussion
Table 1 provides a summary of annual claim ratios dur-
ing the period 2007 to 2012. The average claim ratio for
insurance mode (81.4 %) was lower than that of trust
mode (93.6 %). Table 2 presents the patient satisfaction
rates estimated when the scheme was being fully admin-
istered under the trust mode. Regression results showed
that adding an additional layer of insurance intermediary
between the trust and hospitals reduced the benefit cost
ratio under the scheme by 12.2 % (p-value = 0.06) (see
Table 3). Table 4 presents the linear regression results of
relationship between hospital benefit payments and
empanelled hospital beds. We found that every addition
of 100 beds under the scheme increases the scheme pay-
ments by US$ 0.75 million (p-value = 0). Table 5 gives
the regression results of change of gap in CDR between
insurance and trust modes. The gap in claim denial ratio
between insurance and trust modes narrowed down
from 2.84 % in government hospitals to 0.41 % in private
hospitals (p-value = 0). Figure 1 shows that claim denials
increased in government hospitals when payments were
made through insurance intermediary.
The three most important findings of our study are
first the insurance intermediary increases administra-
tive costs; second more beds under the scheme means
more expenditure; and third the insurance intermedi-
ary hampers payments to government hospitals. We
examine the arguments for and against engaging an
insurance intermediary.
Why do we need an insurance intermediary?
There is an impression that an insurer checks the moral
hazard. Beneficiary enrolment is not part of RAS be-
cause the scheme relies solely on the BPL card issued by
government. Absence of enrolment reduces unnecessary
administrative cost due to enrolment under the scheme.
The mechanism to check moral hazard available to the
insurer, which is abuse of benefits by the beneficiary, is
preauthorisation. The preauthorisation procedure, laid
down by AHCT, is the same for both the
Table 2 Patient satisfaction rate. Percentage of respondents
expressing satisfaction when they were treated under trust mode
Very bad Bad Average Good Very good
Percentage 0.5 1.5 1.9 84.6 11.5
Source-Telephonic survey conducted on 1470 discharged patients during
March and April 2013 through 104 call centre outbound call services of AHCT
Table 1 Claim ratio. Summary of claim ratio by implementation
mode
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Insurance mode 70.9 72.3 81.6 81.4 85.9 96.3
Trust mode 84.6 88 96.5 93.62 96.6 102.4
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implementation modes and the final decision vests with
the trust. Besides, it is known that moral hazard is one
of the problems faced by health insurers across the
world [18, 19]. The belief that insurance intermediary
controls moral hazard is untenable. Incidents of unindi-
cated surgeries are detected among treatment proce-
dures implemented under both the modes of RAS [20–
22]. SID exists in single-payer government funded
schemes as well as in private healthcare insurance set-
tings [23, 24]. Our analysis finds that RAS is functioning
as per Roemer's principle independent of the insurance
intermediary. Hence, SID cannot be linked to the pres-
ence or absence of insurance intermediary. It is seen that
more than 30 % of private hospitals under RAS are lo-
cated in Hyderabad metropolitan region with a popula-
tion of around 12 % [1]. As per Hart's inverse care law,
availability of good medical care tends to vary inversely
with the need for it in the population served [25]. This
highlights the need for equity in geographical distribu-
tion of hospitals.
Patient satisfaction rates above 90 % in any scheme are
generally considered to mean good service levels. We
find that the patient satisfaction rates during the period
when the scheme was entirely administered in trust
mode were above 95 % which suggests that even without
insurance intermediary the patient satisfaction levels
were above the 90 % threshold. This finding about
patient satisfaction rates does not support the claim that
insurance intermediary is better at handling customer
complaints.
RAS engaged the insurance intermediary 22 times dur-
ing the period 2007–12 and except on two occasions,
the hospital claim payments by the insurer did not ex-
ceed the premium amount received from AHCT. The
cumulative claim ratio of 16.4 % suggests that there is
no element of risk absorption by the insurer [5]. Govern-
ment schemes generally involve large payments unlike
the private health insurance schemes. Any miscalcula-
tion of bid amount on the part of insurer at the time of
bidding is said to lead to disastrous results for the in-
surer. The IRDA, therefore, does not allow health in-
surers in India to implement government funded health
insurance schemes if a loss is recorded in any govern-
ment funded scheme during any year. We see an inter-
esting trend in the bidding documents of not only RAS
but also other government financed health insurance
schemes in India where around 20 % of contract value is
allowed to the insurer as administrative cost provided
the actual claim payment falls below 80 % [1]. In case
the actual claim ratio falls below 80 % a certain amount
will be refunded by the insurer to government. Our ana-
lysis finds that the average claim ratio under the insur-
ance mode of RAS hovers around 80 %. This suggests
that the insurer manages the claims ratio around the
level which allows him opportunity of full utilisation of
the 20 % administrative cost while at the same time en-
suring that no refund is required to be made due to
claim ratio falling much below 80 %. The insurer regu-
lates his claims ratio at the desired level based on the
principle that addition of beds leads to an additional
benefit payments. The insurance intermediary, who is
the implementing agency, plays a significant role in add-
ing or removing a hospital under the scheme. Evidence
suggests that the insurance intermediary is, therefore,
not capable of risk absorption under RAS.
It is generally acknowledged that Government hospitals
adopt a negligent attitude in submitting timely claims
Table 4 Regression results of influence of hospital beds on




Hospital beds 7500*** (5833, 9167) 7500*** (6333, 8833)
Constant −173.9 E 06***
(−229.3 E 06, −118.4 E 06)
−173.9 E 06***
(−216.2 E 06,-131.6 E 06)
Observations 12 12
R square 0.881 0.881
Adjusted R square 0.869 0.869
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Conversion rate: US$1 = 60
Table 3 Regression results of benefit cost ratio by
implementation mode
Dependent variable: Benfit-cost ratio
Naive Robust
Trust mode 12.22* (1.11, 23.33) 12.22** (2.28, 22.15)
Constant 81.40*** (73.55, 89.25) 81.40*** (73.22, 89.58)
Observations 10 10
R square 0.37 0.37
Adjusted R square 0.29 0.29
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Insurance mode is reference





Private hospitals −2.43*** (−3.27,-1.59) −2.43
Constant 2.84*** (2.25, 3.44) 2.84 (−5.34, 11.02)
Observations 12 12
R square 0.76 0.76
Adjusted R square 0.74 0.74
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
CDR-Claim Denial Ratio in percent
Reference category is government hospitals
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under RAS. However, such negligence applies equally to
the insurance mode as well as trust mode [26]. Assuming
that the negligence factor remains the same in both
modes, our finding that Government hospitals receive
lesser payments from insurance intermediary compared to
trust mode negates the claim of better operational effi-
ciency of an insurance intermediary.
The subject of study in this scenario is the difference
in payments done under the trust and the insurance
modes to public hospitals for the services already ren-
dered by them. Certain patients were treated by the pub-
lic hospitals under the RAS for which payments had to
be made. The fact that some cases were treated under
RAS in public hospitals indicates that to the extent of
such cases the public hospitals were accessible to the
people. Preauthorisation and claims procedures being
the same between the trust and insurance modes, ideally
there should not be any difference between claims pay-
ments under the trust and insurance modes to the pub-
lic hospitals but our finding was to the contrary.
The state policy of recognising about 87 % of the
population to be BPL brings in large numbers under the
health insurance net. Such large numbers improve the
fund flow forecasts under the scheme. These numbers
could be serving as an attraction for the private hospitals
to get empanelled under the scheme. The insurance
intermediary played an important role in regulating the
empanelment of the private hospitals in order to regu-
late the fund outgo to the hospitals and the trust en-
dorsed this principle.
Administrative costs of private insurance are higher
than government financed insurance schemes [27, 28];
our study confirms this finding. Higher administrative
costs lead to lower expenditure on patient benefits in
view of limited government resources. An insurance
intermediary involves higher administrative cost without
any real improvement in administrative efficiency, as dis-
cussed in the aforementioned sub-section. Therefore en-
gaging additional layers between trust and hospitals
while making payments should not be resorted to. RAS
was established with the help of an insurance company.
It is uncertain as to whether the Trust would have had
the capacity and skills to develop the standard operating
procedures which now underpin the scheme, without
the involvement of the insurance company, especially
because the scheme was launched and successfully ex-
tended to all parts of this state of approximately 80 mil-
lion people with rapid speed. The Trust later transferred
existing business processes developed by the insurer into
their own infrastructure. Other states too, may need
Fig. 1 Claim Denial Ratio. Smoothed line by hospital type, faceted by implementation mode, with 95 % confidence intervals
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such support, and some may continue to need it beyond
the set-up phase, depending on their inherent capacity.
These business processes are developed by the TPAs on
behalf of the insurance companies. Therefore it makes
more sense in directly engaging a TPA for establishing
the business processes needed for setting up an insur-
ance scheme at a lower cost.
It is argued that the insurance intermediary could have
played a role in improving the quality of care in hospi-
tals. The purpose of designing business processes by any
private insurer will be to reduce the claim payments to
hospitals but not necessarily to improve patient health
outcomes. The trust has implemented the business pro-
cesses under the scheme in consultation with the insurer
with the objective of improving patient health outcomes.
A separate study is required on whether the business
processes under the scheme have led to improved health
outcomes.
As discussed, the power of empanelment or removal
of hospitals from RAS under the influence of insurer, in-
volves a risk of collusion between the insurance inter-
mediary and the private hospitals resulting in increases
in premium charged from government year after year. In
Andhra Pradesh scenario where all the private hospitals
comprise of two cartels the risk is even higher [29]. The
only mechanism which is said to check this risk is the
competition among the insurers at the time of bidding.
We see not more than one dozen IRDA licenced health
insurers in the country, out of which four are large pub-
lic sector non-life insurers. One can see a risk of cartel
formation among the private health insurance firms op-
erating in a country with not more than two dozen big
states. It is 'safe' for public-sector insurance firms to lose
a contract by quoting a higher bid in any bid seeking to
hire an insurance intermediary, rather than bag the con-
tract at a low rate and run a risk of loss. A public-sector
insurer is subject to questioning by vigilance and audit
agencies if they make a loss. There is a likelihood that
the bid amount of public sector insurer is leaked before
it files its bid. The prohibition imposed by IRDA on
TPAs, who are the business process outsourcing agen-
cies for health insurance companies in India, from serv-
ing government sponsored schemes also serves as a
disadvantage to the government funded health insurance
schemes [30].
All the critical insurance related functions rendered by
an insurance company such as enrolment of beneficiar-
ies, collection of premium from beneficiaries, fixation of
prices, preauthorisation of treatments and empanelment
of hospitals is done by government or trust in the case
of RAS. If all that government wants is services offered
by a management contractor, engaging an insurance
intermediary and transferring tax money in bulk from
the state exchequer to an insurer should not be resorted
to. Our study finds evidence in support of the tenth rec-
ommendation of HLEG that purchases of all health care
services under the UHC system should be undertaken dir-
ectly by government or through quasi-governmental au-
tonomous agencies [4].
States intending to launch a demand side financed
scheme would require a state run implementing agency
similar to the Trust. During the initial launch and in the
later years, RAS experience shows that a private agency
is required in order to establish the business processes
needed for successful launch of the scheme. The three
options currently available in India are the insurance
company option, the TPA option and the direct imple-
mentation through permanent staff. The first option is
the most expensive and the last option is recognised to
be the most inefficient in terms of operations. Therefore,
we see merit in choosing the option of engaging a TPA
for successful roll out of such schemes where cost effi-
ciency is also of paramount importance in spending tax
money.
There are limitations to this study. First, a certain por-
tion of administrative cost of the trust such as provision
of floor space at subsidised rate to insurer, sharing of a
part of the salary bill of field staff and so on might have
reduced the administrative cost burden of the insurance
intermediary. Though the administrative cost estimates
of insurance mode might be underestimated, the infer-
ences drawn remain valid. Second, the assumption that
the cost of administering a procedure is independent of
district and time period may not be valid. Similarly, all
the procedures may not have the same administrative
costs. The mix of procedures and districts varied with
time under the insurance and the trust modes. At differ-
ent points of time, all the procedures and all the districts
were administered through both the insurance mode
and trust mode as well. The standardisation of pre-
authorisation and claims procedures irrespective of the
type of procedure or the district ensures that our as-
sumption does not make our results invalid. Third, to-
wards the end of the study period, starting from August
2011, a policy stipulating that about 192 medical and
surgical procedures (reserved procedures) out of the
total 938 procedures offered under the scheme could
only be performed in public hospitals was introduced.
About 192 procedures of low to high value ranging from
low to high utilisation were reserved exclusively for pub-
lic hospitals. Such procedures were being funded
through the Trust mode in certain districts and the in-
surance mode in certain other districts. The only differ-
ence is that these procedures are not available in private
hospitals. Public hospitals in about half of the districts in
the State were receiving funds under the Trust mode
while those in the other half were receiving funds
through the Insurance mode. This factor could not have
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influenced the conclusion that CDR for public hospitals
in trust mode is significantly lesser than that of the in-
surance mode because payments to public hospitals were
analysed without reference to whether such procedures
are available in private hospitals or not. Fourth, this
paper does not deal with aspects such as burden of dis-
ease or patient attitude towards public and private hos-
pitals. The subject of study of this paper is confined only
to cost efficiency of engaging an insurance intermediary.
Lastly, the results were based on data pertaining to first
six years of RAS implementation which may be consid-
ered a very small period. Even though these are initial
results, when seen together with the experience of health
insurance in various countries from earlier studies our
inferences remain valid.
Conclusion
Rajiv Aarogysri community health insurance scheme is
operating on the Roemer principle and therefore suffers
from supplier induced demand, irrespective of whether
or not an insurance intermediary is engaged. Engaging
an insurance intermediary not only reduces benefit pay-
ments for beneficiaries but also reduces fund flow to
government hospitals. Aarogyasri Health Care Trust it-
self being the single-payer health insurance agency of
government, adding an additional layer in the form of an
insurance intermediary between the trust and the hospi-
tals should not be done. We therefore, conclude with
the very important policy recommendation that pro-
posals for engaging insurance intermediaries for admin-
istering government funded health insurance schemes
should be abandoned and instead business process out-
sourcing agencies should be engaged in their place
directly.
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